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This symposium issue1 examines securitization a decade after the 
2008 financial crisis. Prior to the crisis, securitization was one of 
America’s dominant means of financing.2 Many observers, however, 
blamed securitization for causing the crisis, sparking regulation that 
arguably has been overly restrictive and, in some cases, even punitive.3 
Where are we now? 
 
II. What Is Securitization? 
 
 Securitization enables a company to raise financing without 
borrowing from a bank (it therefore “disintermediates,” or removes, the 
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Senior Fellow, the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI); and 
(during Spring 2018) Distinguished Visiting Professor, University College 
London Faculty of Laws. The author thanks the participants in the 2018 Annual 
SICCL Lecture at the University of Sheffield School of Law for valuable 
comments. 
1 Symposium, Securitization: Ten Years after the Financial Crisis, 37 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 757–927 (2018). Articles are authored by Tamar Frankel; 
Jason H.P. Kravitt, Sairah Burki & Stacy S. Lee; Jonathan C. Lipson; and 
Matthew C. Turk. 
2 Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Company for Structured 
Financings, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,248 (Nov. 27, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
270).  
3 See, e.g., Ronald S. Borod, Belling the Cat: Taming the Securitization Beast 
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need for banks as financial intermediaries)4 and without issuing securities 
whose pricing is dependent on the creditworthiness of the company.5 In a 
highly simplified example,6 a company will sell certain of its rights to 
payment (financial assets), such as loans or accounts receivable, to a 
“bankruptcy remote” special purpose entity (SPE, sometimes called a 
special purpose vehicle or SPV). The SPE will issue securities7 to inves-
tors, repayable from collections of cash on the financial assets. The 
investors thus look to the financial assets, not to the company itself, for 
repayment.8 
In 2007, the volume of securities issued in securitization trans-
actions approximated $6.44 trillion in the United States9 and €595 billion 
in Europe.10 The financial crisis caused these levels to decline precipi-
tously.11 By 2015, for example, the volume of U.S. securitization 
                                                 
4 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: Rethinking 
Assumptions about Limited Liability, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (2014) 
(explaining how disintermediation is characteristic of the so-called shadow 
banking system). 
5 Jonathan C. Lipson, Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229, 
1239–45 (2012) (identifying the elements and functions of securitization).  
6 For a more nuanced examination of securitization and its forms, compare id. at 
1271–80 (arguing for a redefinition of securitization), with Steven L. Schwarcz, 
What Is Securitization? And for What Purpose?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1288–
99 (2012) (addressing issues with Lipson’s proposed definition of securitization).  
7 These debt securities are often called asset-backed securities (ABS). When 
specifically backed by financial assets consisting of mortgage loans, these debt 
securities are commonly called mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Schwarcz, 
supra note 6, at 1292.  
8 Id. at 1293.  
9 SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, Vol. 111, No. 2, RESEARCH QUARTERLY 2 
(2008), www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/us-research-quarterly-2007-
q4.pdf [https://perma.cc/25KD-RHXY]. 
10 ASS’N OF FIN. MKTS. IN EUROPE, SECURITIZATION DATA REPORT: EUROPEAN 
STRUCTURED FINANCE FOR Q1 2016 7 (2016), https://www. 
afme.eu/globalassets/downloads/data/securitisation/2016/afme-stn-securitisation-
data-report-q1-20161-v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2TP-BCJW]. 
11 See id. (detailing the total issuance of securities in Europe and the United 
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issuance had collapsed to $1.9 trillion,12 and the volume of European 
securitization issuance had declined to €214 billion.13  
 While securitization is still under suspicion in the United States, 
it is increasingly used as a financial tool abroad.14 One of the key goals of 
the European Commission’s proposed Capital Markets Union, for 
example, is to further facilitate securitization as a source of capital market 
financing, as a viable alternative to bank-based finance for companies 
operating in the European Union.15 Because financial assets can be easier 
to understand and value, if not safer, than the business and risks 
associated with operating a company, securitization offers companies an 
efficient and usually lower-cost funding source.16 Authors Kravitt, Burki, 
and Lee add that regulators “generally acknowledge that, when utilized 
                                                 
12 Press Release, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, SIFMA Issues 2015 Securi-
tization Year in Review (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.sifma.org/newsroom/ 
2016/sifma-issues-2015-securitization-year-in-review/ [https://perma.cc/ 4XNA-
BHZA]. 
13 ASS’N OF FIN. MKTS. IN EUROPE, supra note 10, at 7. 
14 Securitisation: It’s Back, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2014, at 12 (discussing the 
benefits of increased securitization for Europe).  
15 The Capital Markets Union initiative includes a range of reforms of various 
sectors of the European financial system to help build an integrated European 
capital market. See Commission Staff Working Document: Economic Analysis, at 
8–20, COM (2015) 468 final (Sept. 30, 2015), http://edz.bib.uni-
mannheim.de/edz/pdf/swd/2015/swd-2015-0183-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/982L-
A2U4] (discussing the benefits of decreased reliance on bank-based finance). 
The key objectives of the Capital Markets Union are to improve access to 
financing for European businesses, to increase and diversify sources of funding 
from investors in the EU and all over the world, and to make the fragmented 
European markets more integrated, efficient and effective. See Commission 
Green Paper on Building a Capital Markets Union, at 4, COM (2015) 63 final 
(Feb. 18, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/ finance/consultations/2015/capital-markets-
union/docs/green-paper_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/WRR9-5KA6]. 
16 Securities backed by financial assets are usually more creditworthy, and thus 
can be sold at a lower interest rate, than securities issued directly by the 
originators. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION § 1:3 (3d ed. & Supps. 2010) (explaining 
that, except for the most highly rated issuers, securities issued in securitization 
transactions are typically more highly rated than the issuer’s own debt securities 
and, even where the latter are more highly rated, securitization provides 
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properly and wisely, securitization is an important source of funding” for 
the real economy.17 
 
III. Fixing Securitization’s Abuses 
 
 There is little doubt certain abuses of securitization were causal 
factors in the financial crisis.18 The U.S. regulatory responses to securiti-
zation are primarily embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act and partially in 
U.S. implementation of the Basel III capital requirements.19 I have argued 
these responses conceptually fall into four categories: (i) increasing 
disclosure; (ii) requiring risk-retention; (iii) reforming rating agencies; 
and (iv) imposing capital requirements.20 The European regulatory 
responses conceptually fall into five categories: the same four indicated 
above, as well as requiring certain due diligence.21 
The symposium papers largely concur that these regulatory 
responses inadequately address securitization’s abuses. Kravitt, Burki, 
and Lee argue, for example, the “post-crisis securitization industry is 
subject to an extensive patchwork of rules, many of which . . . don’t 
address the underlying causes of the crisis.”22 I agree, except insofar as I 
will discuss how the EU’s simple, transparent, and standardized (STS) 
framework addresses the problem of complexity.23  
Otherwise, these regulatory responses tend to miss the mark.24 
For example, one of the primary criticisms of securitization has been of 
its originate-to-distribute (OTD) model of making and collecting (pool-
ing) loans to securitize, thereby arguably creating moral hazard because 
the makers (originators) of the loans do not hold onto, and thus do not 
                                                 
17 See Jason H.P. Kravitt et al., Some Thoughts on Financial Regulatory Reform 
Adopted in Response to the Financial Crisis of 2008/9, 37 REV. BANKING & FIN. 
L. 779, 785 (2018). 
18 Mathew C. Turk, Regulation by Rulemaking or by Settlement?, 37 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 861, 870–74 (2018) (discussing the securitization of 
residential mortgages as a primary cause of the 2008 crisis). 
19 See id. at 876 (reviewing the Dodd-Frank reforms); Kravitt et al., supra note 
17, at 789–99 (describing the Basel III framework). 
20 Steven L. Schwarcz, A Global Perspective on Securitised Debt, in CAPITAL 
MARKETS UNION IN EUROPE (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds.) (2018). 
21 Id. 
22 Kravitt et al., supra note 17, at 781–82. 
23 See infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
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necessarily bear, risk for the ultimate performance of the loans.25 To 
reduce moral hazard, the Dodd-Frank Act requires lenders to retain an 
unhedged portion—ordinarily at least 5 percent—of the credit risk on the 
loans they sell into securitization transactions.26 By compelling lenders to 
have “skin in the game,” Congress believed lenders would act more 
prudently when originating loans.27   
Symposium author Turk uses that risk-retention example to 
argue that although Dodd-Frank-Act and its associated rulemakings 
appear to impose “a comprehensive new regulatory framework for 
securitization,” the “real-world effect” of the framework is de minimis.28 
Contrary to the premise that lenders retained minimal risk on the loans 
they sold into securitization transactions, he observes,” [i]n reality, it was 
common practice for the bank sponsoring a securitization to retain a 
substantial amount of the . . . risk” on those loans.29 In principle,30 I agree 
with Professor Turk’s observation to the extent it concerns risk-retention:  
 
In my experience—which is confirmed by market 
information—sophisticated purchasers have generally, 
even before the financial crisis, required sellers of loans 
to retain skin in the game, or the equivalent. This not only 
helps to realign incentives between the parties but also 
provides the fundamental solution to the “lemons” 
problem of asymmetric information . . . . These observa-
tions cast doubt on the need for regulatory intervention to 
                                                 
25 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 211, 256 (2009). 
26 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78o–11 (2012). Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires this risk retention 
for all but the highest quality loans that originators sell. Originators and other 
sellers of Qualified Residential Mortgage loans—a designation based on a 
borrower’s ability to repay the mortgage loan at origination, verification of the 
borrower’s income, and certain other relevant considerations—are not subject to 
risk-retention requirements. 
27 Steven L. Schwarcz, Secured Transactions and Financial Stability: Regulatory 
Challenges, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4 (forthcoming 2018), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3033052. 
28 Turk, supra note 18, at 880, 901. 
29 Id. at 880 (highlighting “the fact that the entire [risk retention] rule rests on a 
mistaken premise”). 
30 I note, technically, that risk retention on originated loans and on loans sold by 
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attempt to correct a market failure that the market has 
already addressed.31 
 
Professor Turk further explains “sponsor banks opted to hold 
onto part of the risk from their securitizations for the specific purpose of 
signaling the quality of the securities they were issuing to investors.”32 I 
have argued that this signaling inadvertently created a unique informa-
tional market failure, one in which the failure is not asymmetric infor-
mation, but mutual misinformation caused by complexity such that 
neither the sponsor of the securitization nor the investors fully understand 
the risks associated with the underlying financial assets.33 
 Symposium author Lipson makes an interesting and novel 
argument to further explain the failure of the OTD model.34 He contends 
it was caused by social distance—a variance in the levels of trust and 
reciprocity between, on one hand, borrowers of residential mortgage 
loans and, on the other hand, investors in the securities backed by those 
mortgage loans (the residential mortgage-backed securities, or RMBS) 
and servicers of those loans.35 He also argues how to close this social 
distance.36 We do not have sufficient empirical evidence, however, to 
know the extent to which social distance explains the failure of the OTD 
model. It appears likely, however, it could help to explain at least part of 
that failure: inefficiencies and misunderstandings created by conflicting 
interests of individual home mortgagors and institutional collection 
agents hired to enforce defaulted and delinquent mortgage loans for the 
benefit of large RMBS investors.37  
                                                 
31 Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 4–5. 
32 Turk, supra note 18, at 882.  
33 Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 6–8; cf. infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
34 Jonathan C. Lipson, Securitization and Social Distance, 37 REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. 827, 829 (2018).  
35 Id. at 830–31 (defining the concept of social distance).  
36 Id. at 855 (“Closing the social distance created by the legal distance of RMBS 
securitization requires four things: (i) timely information exchange; (ii) 
communication; (iii) authority to act; and (iv) a mechanism to formally recognize 
the resolution.”). 
37 See id. at 846–55 (arguing RMBS contract terms kept borrowers and loan 
servicers apart at times when they could have resolved a default through 
negotiations and avoided inefficient judicial foreclosures). But see Jeff Holt, A 
Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the Resulting Credit 
Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 120–29 (2009) (finding 
loose lending standards and poor underwriting practices before a social 
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Finally, while Professor Turk concurs post-crisis regulation of 
securitization has accomplished little, he argues administrative enforce-
ment actions against securitization sponsors, which resulted in multi-
billion dollar settlements, have actually accomplished some real reform.
38
 
He maintains that these settlements, considered as a whole, create a “de 
facto legal prohibition against misconduct in securitization markets, 
roughly equivalent to a negligence standard.”
39
 Although some scholars 
see these settlements merely as the cost of doing business,
40
 the settle-
ments no doubt have had some impact in making securitization sponsors 
more careful.
41
 My concern with these enforcement actions and resulting 
settlements, however, is two-fold. First, to the extent securitization 
sponsors in fact acted illegally, “firms themselves are second-best targets 
of deterrence. Targeting managers in their personal capacity is thus 
widely viewed as a greater, if not also a more optimal, deterrent than 
firm-level liability.”
42
 Second, as Turk himself acknowledges, many of 
these settlements were compelled by reputational and politically induced 
duress on securitization sponsors that in fact acted legally; they therefore 
create more of a strict liability than a negligence standard.
43
 Imposing ex 
post strict liability for legal actions is inconsistent with “the American 




IV. Rebuilding Confidence 
 
The revival of securitization will depend on rebuilding confi-
dence.
45
 This, in turn, depends on developing a regulatory framework that 
maximizes securitization’s benefits and minimizes potential for harm.
46
 
                                                                                                       
bubble, thus suggesting social distance appears much less likely to explain 
origination-related failures of the OTD model). 
38
 Turk, supra note 18, at 912–16 (referring to this administrative lawmaking as 
“regulation by settlement”). 
39
 Id. at 925. 
40
 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Excessive Corporate Risk-Taking and the Decline of 
Personal Blame, 65 EMORY L.J. 533, 537–38 (2015) (discussing these views of 
Professors Anat Admati and John Coffee). 
41
 Id. at 537.  
42
 Id. at 536. 
43
 Turk, supra note 18, at 918–19 (discussing a strict liability standard). 
44
 Turk himself recognizes this conundrum. See id. at 912. 
45
 Cf. Miguel Segoviano et al., Reviving Securitization, in FINANCIAL STABILITY 
REVIEW 51, 52 (Banque de Fr. ed., 19th ed. 2015).  
46
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To achieve this, the United States could learn from the European Union.47 
The EU is creating a regulatory framework favouring simple, transparent, 
and standardized (STS) securitization.48 The STS framework is specific-
ally designed to increase investor confidence in securitization.49  
The STS framework addresses the issue of complexity, one of 
the two fundamental causes of market failures (the other being change) 
that apply distinctively to securitization.50 By simplifying securitization 
structures, it should help to make disclosure more effective, in contrast to 
disclosure’s occasional failure in much more highly complex securitiza-
tion transactions.51  
The STS framework also directly discourages complexity.52 Prior 
to the financial crisis, securities issued in many securitization transactions 
                                                 
47 Christian Noyer, The Financing of the Economy in the Post-Crisis Period: 
Challenges and Risks for Financial Stability, in FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW 7, 
9 (Banque de Fr. ed., 19th ed. 2015) (explaining how the European Union is in 
the process of implementing initiatives to revive the securitisation market). 
48 Id.  
49 See Commission First Status Report on Capital Markets Union, at 2–3, 21, 
SWD (2016) 147 final (Apr. 25, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/ 
cmu-first-status-report_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY8F-J84Z]. The STS frame-
work includes requiring: (i) a true sale or similar transfer of the underlying 
financial assets; (ii) those financial assets must meet simplicity requirements, 
including homogeneity, creditworthiness (e.g., not in default, not from insolvent 
obligors or obligors with adverse credit history), and not constituting already 
securitized financial assets; (iii) interest-rate and exchange-rate risks must be 
hedged; (iv) other than to effect such hedging, the financial assets cannot be 
supported by derivatives, as would occur in a “synthetic” securitization; (v) 
transaction documents must clearly specify obligations, duties, and responsibilities 
of the servicer and back-up servicer to ensure efficient and continuing servicing of 
the financial assets and must also include clear provisions facilitating the timely 
resolution of conflicts among different classes of investors; (vi) and investors must 
receive a cash-flow model of anticipated collections on the financial assets, 
supported by information on historical default, delinquency, and loss performance 
for substantially similar financial assets to those being securitized. Also, a sample 
of the financial assets may be subject to external verification by an independent 
party. See Schwarcz, supra note 20. 
50 Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization and Post-Crisis Financial Regulation, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 115, 131–33 (2016). 
51 Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 3 
UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1113 (2008) (“The complexity of the transactions, however, 
caused the disclosures to be insufficient, cutting into the very heart of federal 
securities regulation . . . .”). 
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were “re-securitized” in complex and highly leveraged “ABS CDO” 
transactions.53 Repayment of the re-securitized securities issued in these 
transactions was so “extremely sensitive to cash-flow variations” that, 
when “the cash-flow assumptions turned out to be wrong, many of these 
[securities] defaulted or were downgraded.”54 That, in turn, sparked a loss 
of confidence not only in securitization generally but also in the value of 
credit ratings and of all highly rated debt securities.55 The STS framework 
strongly disincentivizes these types of complex transactions.56 
More may be needed, however, to address the second market 
failure—change.57 Although the financial system is constantly changing, 
financial regulation is normally tethered to the distinctive design and 
structure of financial firms, markets, and products in existence when the 
regulation is promulgated.58 Without continuous monitoring and 
updating—which rarely occurs because it is costly and subject to political 
interference—present-day regulation can quickly become outmoded.59 
Prior to the financial crisis, for example, the entrenched legacy of bank 
regulation obscured the fact that securitization had replaced a significant 
portion of the need for bank financing.60 Kravitt, Burki, and Lee concur 
“[o]nly continuous evaluation will allow all market participants to gain a 
deeper understanding of the financial system . . . .”61 
Securitization itself is particularly prone to change.62 Although 
the Dodd-Frank Act focuses on regulating mortgage-loan securitization,63 
                                                 
53 The term ABS CDO refers to a securitization of collateralized debt obligations. 
Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1285.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1285–86 (using Enron as an example). 
56 See Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 134–36. 
57 Id. at 137 (arguing that regulators cannot predict the types of assets that will 
securitized in the future). 
58 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A 
Functional Approach, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (2016) (discussing the 
need to regulate financial change). 
59 Id. at 1443. 
60 Id. at 1443–44 (“[T]he pre-crisis financial regulatory framework . . . failed to 
adequately address a collapsing financial system in which the majority of funding 
had become non-bank intermediated.”); cf. Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 2. 
61 Kravitt et al., supra note 17, at 784. 
62 See also id. (explaining how regulation requires “constant reevaluation” due to 
changes in securitization). 
63 The Dodd-Frank Act focuses on a range of mortgage lending laws, including 
ability-to-repay rules, high-cost mortgage and homeownership counselling, 
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virtually any type of financial asset—of which mortgage loans are but 
one example—can be securitized.64 Regulators simply cannot predict and 
attempt to prevent all future financial problems.65 To illustrate this, 
compare how two very different types of financial assets were at the core 
of both the financial crisis and the Great Depression. 
Prior to the Depression, many banks engaged in margin 
lending to risky borrowers, securing the loans by shares 
of stock that the borrowers purchased with the loan 
proceeds. The value of the stock collateral started out 
being at least equal to the amount of the loan, and banks 
assumed that the stock market, which had been 
continuously rising in value for some years, would 
continue to rise, or at least not decline, in value. At the 
time, that assumption was viewed as reasonable. In 
August 1929, however, there was a (relatively) modest 
decline in stock prices, causing some of these margin 
loans to become under-collateralized. Some banks that 
were heavily engaged in margin lending then lost so 
much money on the loans that they themselves became 
unable to pay their debts . . . . These debts consisted not 
only of amounts due depositors but, more systemically 
significant, debts due to other banks. As a result, defaults 
by these margin-lending banks on their obligations to 
other banks often adversely affected the other banks’ 
ability to meet their obligations to yet other banks, and 
“so on down the chain of banks and beyond.”66 
This almost perfectly paralleled the problem with “subprime” 
mortgage loans at the heart of the financial crisis. Banks and other lenders 
                                                                                                       
Opportunity Act, appraisals under the Truth in Lending Act, and loan originator 
compensation structures. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE CFPB DODD-
FRANK MORTGAGE RULES READINESS GUIDE (2015), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb_readiness-guide_mortgage-
implementation.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6FT-DQX7]  
64 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1295–98. 
65 Schwarcz, supra note 58, at 1442–45. 
66 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an 
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1356–57 (2011) 
(evaluating the types of financial assets at issue during the Great Depression and 
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loaned money to risky borrowers to enable them to buy homes.67 The 
borrowers secured the loans by mortgaging the homes they purchased 
with the loan proceeds.68 The value of the homes started out being at least 
equal to the amount of the loan, and lenders assumed home prices, which 
had been continuously rising for some years, would continue to rise, or at 
least not decline, in value—an assumption that, at the time, was viewed 
as reasonable.69 In 2007, however, a decline in the housing market caused 
some of these mortgage loans to become under-collateralized, triggering 
the wave of defaults that started the financial crisis.70  
Although one might argue that lenders should have seen that 
possibility, two flaws obscured their sight: first, it is human nature for 
people to assess the present by their experience of the recent past;71 
second, political pressure by Congress on banks and mortgage lenders 
induced them to make subprime mortgage loans to facilitate home 
ownership.72 Another impediment is that financial change can evolve 
incrementally, preventing recognition of increasing risk.73 
V. Lessons 
 
Traditional ex ante regulation designed to prevent a financial 
failure is necessary, but inherently insufficient.74 Complexity and change 
                                                 
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 1359–60 (“These securities maintained their value so long as 
home prices appreciated, as they had been doing for decades and as most market 
observers assumed would continue.”). 
70 Id. at 1360.  
71 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations 
and Legal Efficacy, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1079 (2018) (explaining 
availability bias). 
72 See Peter J. Wallison, Dissenting Statement to FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 441, 452–53 (2011) (discussing how 
political pressure led Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to lower mortgage 
underwriting standards). 
73 Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, 
Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 686–87 (2012) (claiming 
the “incremental nature of the processes through which financial innovations 
become highly complex is critical to understanding how that complexity 
develops and why that complexity itself may not be subjected to close scrutiny”). 
74 Schwarcz, supra note 58, at 1448 (describing how ex ante regulation often 
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make it difficult if not impossible to predict, and thus avert, failures.75 Ex 
ante regulation of securitization thus should be supplemented by ex post 
regulation to mitigate the consequences of inevitable financial failures.76 
 Symposium author Frankel suggests another lesson about 
regulating securitization.77 In the past, she argued the law of cross-border 
securitization “is developed and established by the lawyers who structure 
these transactions,” referring to this as lex Juris.78 She has also discussed 
how lex Juris helped standardize the laws regarding securitization, such 
as laws regarding bankruptcy remoteness of asset transfers.79 In this 
symposium edition, Professor Frankel provides a contrasting discussion 
of the EU’s STS framework.80 Asking who should regulate, she argues 
that the government should regulate “on a higher scale” and lawyers 
should regulate on the lower scale of “individual cases.”81  
I would answer the question of who should regulate slightly 
differently. Lawyers, sometimes aided by their clients, normally make 
transaction-specific rules, which govern how securitization and other 
financial transactions operate.82 These rules are intended to maximize 
transactional efficiency, thereby benefiting the parties to the transaction.83 
Lawyers and their clients are not necessarily motivated, however, to 
make rules that constrain externalities.84 Therefore, governments should 
                                                 
75 See Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 134–38. 
76 See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can 
Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75 (2013). In a 
broader financial context, I have also analyzed how regulation could better 
address change by regulating finance functions, which remain more constant 
over time. See Schwarcz, supra note 58, at 1441. 
77 Tamar Frankel, The Law of Cross-Border Securitization: From Lex Juris to 
Codes of Law, 37 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 771 (2018). 
78 Tamar Frankel, The Law of Cross-Border Securitization: Lex Juris, 12 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 475, 480 (2002). 
79 Id. at 479–80. 
80 Frankel, supra note 77, at 777–78. 
81 Id. at 778. 
82 Frankel, supra note 78, at 480 (“Lawyers and other professionals, such as 
investment bankers, create many innovative structures on which the success of 
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